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Abstract The study examines the relationship between executive compensation and ﬁrm per-
formance among Indian ﬁrms. The evidence suggests that ﬁrm performance measured by ac-
counting, as well as market-based measures, signiﬁcantly affects executive compensation. We
also test for the presence of persistence in executive compensation by employing the system-
generalised methods of moments (GMM) estimator. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant persistence in executive
compensation among the sample ﬁrms. Further, we report the absence of pay–performance re-
lationship among the smaller sample ﬁrms and business group afﬁliated ﬁrms. Thus, our ﬁnd-
ings cast doubts over the performance-based executive compensation practices of Indian business
group afﬁliated ﬁrms.
© 2016 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Indian Institute of Management
Bangalore. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Introduction
The relationship between executive pay and ﬁrm perfor-
mance has been one of the most widely studied questions in
the corporate governance literature (Frye, 2004; Jensen &
Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1999; Rosen, 1992). Over the past two
decades, the academic literature on agency theory and ex-
ecutive compensation has argued that CEO compensation
should be aligned to ﬁrm performance (Holmstrom, 1979,
Grossman & Hart, 1983, and Jensen & Murphy, 1990). The re-
lation between pay and performance is derived from agency
theory (Holmstrom, 1979, or Grossman & Hart, 1983). Ac-
cording to agency theory, compensation contracts should be
designed to align the interests of managers (agents) with those
of shareholders (principals). A stronger relationship between
executive pay and performance also results in the selection
and retention of more productive managers. Since these
factors are difﬁcult to observe while selecting managers, pro-
viding top executives with performance related compensa-
tion can reduce the adverse selection problems (Arya &
Mittendorf, 2005; Darrough & Melumad, 1995).
The problem of how best to compensate executives is a
classic application of the principal–agent theory. In such a
framework, the principal (the shareholder) desires the agent
(the manager) to maximise shareholder value, but cannot ac-
curately evaluate the executive’s reaction function. The goals
of the executives may be different from that of the share-
holders. For instance, a manager may be more interested in
amassing and defending personal power rather than pursu-
ing proﬁt maximising strategies (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003).
While the literature on pay–performance has been largely
focussed on the Anglo-Saxon economies, limited research has
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been carried out in the context of emerging markets. In the
Indian context, studies focussing on the managerial labour
market and executive compensation have been a recent phe-
nomenon. The effect of economic liberalisation along with
changes in the market for managerial talent has resulted in sig-
niﬁcant changes in the compensation policies adopted by Indian
companies. In this paper, we examine the relationship between
pay and performance among Indian ﬁrms. We select India as
it reﬂects the characteristics of an emerging market economy,
such as underdeveloped regulatory and institutional mecha-
nisms, and weak investor activism (Balasubramanian, Black, &
Khanna, 2010; Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Narayanaswamy,
Raghunandan, & Rama, 2012). Our ﬁndings are expected to have
applicability elsewhere in other emerging markets.
Sen and Sarkar (1996), from their cross sectional exami-
nation of large Indian ﬁrms, reported the existence of in-
creasing pay differentials across hierarchies. Ghosh (2006),
studying Indian ﬁrms, reported that CEO compensation is posi-
tively affected by ﬁrm performance. However, Indian ﬁrms
are mandated to disclose compensation information only from
2002, implementing the recommendations of the Kumar
Mangalam Birla committee.1 Hence, studies examining Indian
ﬁrms’ compensation information prior to 2002 may tend to
offer inappropriate conclusions. Parthasarathy, Menon, and
Bhattacharjee (2006), utilising the cross-sectional data for
the year 2005, reported that the promoter-CEOs receive higher
pay among Indian ﬁrms. In the present paper, we empiri-
cally examine the pay–performance relationship among Indian
ﬁrms, using ﬁrm level information from the years 2002 to 2012.
Our study contributes to the literature in at least three
ways. First, we examine the relationship between pay and
performance from the year 2002 to 2012. From the year 2002,
disclosure of executive compensation became mandatory for
Indian ﬁrms following the recommendations of the Birla com-
mittee as mentioned. We have now information on ﬁrm level
compensation for the period of at least one decade. Such a
dataset allows us to carry out rigorous statistical analysis in
examining the pay–performance relationship among Indian
ﬁrms. Second, we focus on emerging markets, as the re-
search thus far focussed on ﬁrms operating in Anglo-Saxon
economies. The managerial market in India is still in the de-
veloping stage and there are also business group interven-
tions as a large number of companies in India are controlled
by family owned business groups. In this scenario, our study
would possibly provide better insights on pay–performance
relationship in India. Finally, we contribute to the discus-
sion on the persistence in executive compensation prac-
tices as we attempt to examine the impact of past
compensation on the current executive compensation. We
employ the system-generalised methods of moments (GMM)
estimator to account for the potential endogeneity (between
pay and performance) problem in examining the pay–
performance relationship among the sample ﬁrms. Thus, to
the best of our knowledge, ours is an attempt for the ﬁrst time
to comprehensively examine the pay–performance relation-
ship among Indian ﬁrms, using the wider ﬁrm level dataset.
We organise the rest of the paper as follows. The second
section outlines the existing literature. The third section dis-
cusses corporate governance and executive compensation dis-
closure practices among Indian ﬁrms. The fourth section
describes the sample selection and its characteristics. The
ﬁfth section discusses the estimation procedure and the ﬁnd-
ings. The sixth section provides the concluding remarks.
Review of literature
In this section, we present a brief review of existing studies
that have examined the relationship between executive com-
pensation and ﬁrm performance. We further emphasise the
potential contribution from the present study.
Executive compensation and ﬁrm performance
In one of the earliest studies, Jensen and Murphy (1990) em-
pirically examined the relationship between CEO compensa-
tion and ﬁrm performance. They considered a large sample
of US ﬁrms during the period of 1974–1986. They computed
an estimate of the pay for performance sensitivity (PPS) and
reported that ﬁrm performance positively inﬂuences CEO com-
pensation. Hall and Liebman (1998) found a signiﬁcant posi-
tive relationship between ﬁrm performance and CEO
compensation. They observed that such a relationship has been
the result of changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock
and stock options.
Boschen and Smith (1995) examined the relationship
between executive compensation and a ﬁrm’s past as well
as contemporaneous performance. The study measured the
performance of sample ﬁrms, using their stock market returns.
They examined 16 US ﬁrms over the period of 1948–1990. They
concluded that past performance has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on current compensation, but the effect is not permanent.
Their study also reports changes in pay–performance sensi-
tivity over the four decades of their study period. Current as
well as previous year ﬁrm performance has a positive effect
on the compensation of the CEO (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker,
1999; Rose & Shepard, 1997). In line with the previous studies,
we study the impact of contemporaneous as well as past per-
formance on executive pay among Indian ﬁrms.
Persistence in executive compensation
Main, Bruce, and Buck (1996) examined the relation between
total board compensation and company performance among
UK based companies. They considered past pay as lagged de-
pendent variable in their model to capture dynamic aspects
of compensation contracts and found it signiﬁcant. Boschen
and Smith (1995) also estimated complete dynamic response
of CEO pay to ﬁrm performance by considering persistence
of pay. They found that cumulative response of pay to per-
formance is more than contemporaneous and also that com-
pensation arrangements have shifted towards greater
performance sensitivity and long term pay arrangements.
Bender (2003) reported that remuneration committees of UK
ﬁrms often consider past pay as reference point while ﬁxing
current pay. Doucouliagos, Graham, andHaman (2012) in their
recent study investigated the dynamics and convergence in
CEO pay among Australia’s large corporations over an 18 year
1 http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.html (accessed on
11th July 2016).
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period. Utilising dynamic panel estimators, they reported the
persistence in executive compensation and found that CEOpay
is driven by dynamic adjustments, ﬁrm size, board size, CEO
tenure, and ﬁrm performance. Among the dynamic adjust-
ments, they considered past pay as one of the explanatory vari-
ables in their model. Considering the persistence nature of
executive compensation, we attempt to examine the impact
ofpastpayalongwithﬁrmperformanceoncurrentcompensation.
Executive compensation and ﬁrm speciﬁc
characteristics
Firm speciﬁc characteristics such as size, leverage, and risk
are expected to inﬂuence executive compensation. Rosen
(1992) provides a theoretical justiﬁcation for the positive re-
lation between executive pay and ﬁrm size. Empirical studies
such as Murphy (1985), Zhou (2000), and Ryan and Wiggins
(2001) reported that ﬁrms’ size positively inﬂuences their ex-
ecutive compensation. Murphy (1999), on the contrary, re-
ported that pay–performance sensitivity is weaker among the
larger US ﬁrms. In the light of this mixed evidence on the re-
lationship between executive compensation and ﬁrm size, we
empirically examine the relationship among our sample ﬁrms.
Further, we classify our sample ﬁrms into small as well as large
sub-samples and investigate the pay–performance sensitiv-
ity separately.
Jensen (1986) argues that debt ﬁnancing with its ﬁxed con-
tractual obligations acts as a disciplining device for manag-
ers and mitigates the agency problems. If the ﬁrms consider
debt as a disciplining mechanism, they need not solely depend
on compensation to incentivise their executives. Hence, ﬁrms
with higher leverage ratios are expected to have lower ex-
ecutive compensation practices. Studies such as Palepu and
Healy (2007) and Penman (2007) empirically support the ar-
gument as they report negative association between ﬁrms’
leverage ratios and their executive compensation. Firm spe-
ciﬁc risk is another potential determinant of executive com-
pensation. We consider beta as a measure of risk for the ﬁrm
with respect to market. Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2002) ﬁnd
that cash ﬂow risk has signiﬁcant negative association with
cash compensation of the CEO. It is expected that the risk
of the ﬁrm has an inverse relationship with the executive
compensation.
Studies focussing on Indian ﬁrms
As mentioned earlier, studies focussing on the managerial
labour market and executive compensation among Indian ﬁrms
have been a recent phenomenon. Sen and Sarkar (1996) ex-
amined the intra- and inter-ﬁrm differences in managerial
characteristics (such as age, experience, qualiﬁcation and re-
muneration) among large Indian ﬁrms. They reported the ex-
istence of a tournament structure (increasing pay differentials
in hierarchies) of salaries among their sample ﬁrms. The study,
however, was conﬁned to a small number of large ﬁrms for
the year 1990–91 with limited empirical implications.
Ramaswamy, Veliyath, and Gomez (2000), in their examina-
tion of 150 large Indian ﬁrms, reported that ﬁrm perfor-
mance as measured by return on assets (ROA) as a signiﬁcant
variable along with other governance variables. Ghosh (2006),
studying 462 Indian ﬁrms for the period of 1997–2002, re-
ported that there is a positive association between CEO com-
pensation and ﬁrm performance. He also found that executive
board compensation is inﬂuenced by ﬁrms’ current as well
as past performance. Parthasarathy et al. (2006) in their cross
sectional study of 500 Indian ﬁrms examined the inﬂuence of
ﬁrm performance and ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics including
corporate governance factors on executive compensation.
They reported that executive compensation is not inﬂu-
enced by ﬁrm performance. However, the study reported that
ﬁrm speciﬁc factors such as size signiﬁcantly inﬂuence ex-
ecutive compensation. In the light of the above inconclu-
sive evidence on the pay–performance relationship among
Indian ﬁrms, we comprehensively examine the relationship
between ﬁrms’ performance and their executive compensa-
tion in the present study.
Corporate governance and executive
compensation disclosures in India
The thrust for better corporate governance practices has been
an integral part of the Indian regulatory environment. Indian
companies have been largely governed by the Indian Com-
panies Act, 1956, which provides detailed guidelines on the
formation and functioning of the companies. Although there
have been several provisions under the Companies Act about
board structure and composition and managerial remunera-
tion, the act does not deal with corporate governance di-
rectly. The guidelines for corporate governance and executive
compensation in India mainly come from Securities Ex-
change Board of India (SEBI) in the form of corporate gover-
nance directives and the Indian Companies Act(s).
Evolution of corporate governance practices
in India
The Indian Companies Act 1956 contains provisions for mana-
gerial and executive remuneration for listed companies.
Section 198 of the act provides for a ceiling on the overall
remuneration payable to managerial personnel. It man-
dates that the total remuneration payable to executive per-
sonnel of a public company or subsidiary private company
should not exceed 11% of the net proﬁts of the company in
a ﬁnancial year. It also prohibits payment of remuneration
(except sitting fees) in a year when the company has in-
curred severe losses or has garnered inadequate proﬁts.
Section 309 supplements the provisions contained in Section
198 and states that the remuneration of all whole-time or man-
aging directors taken together shall not exceed 10% of the
net proﬁts of the company in a ﬁnancial year except with prior
approval from the Government of India. These require-
ments made the management of the companies account-
able and provided regulations to control executive
compensation. However, the failure in the effective imple-
mentation of corporate governance provisions led to the col-
lapse of certain well established ﬁrms like Satyam Computer
Services Ltd (2009), similar to the cases reported across the
globe such as Xerox, Enron, and World Com. These failures
highlighted the need for better laws and regulations to oversee
the corporate governance practices including executive
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compensation. In 1991, the Indian Government enacted a
series of reforms aimed at general economic liberalisation.
The Securities and Exchange Board of India has been estab-
lished as per the SEBI act in 1992 to nurture, monitor and regu-
late the growth of capital markets in India. The focus on better
corporate governance practices has become essential mainly
due to the opening up of the economy which led to in-
creased competition and also increased requirement of ex-
ternal capital. The ﬁrst major initiative to have structured
corporate governance norms was undertaken by the Confed-
eration of Indian Industry (CII), India’s largest industry and
business association. The Confederation of Indian Industry sug-
gested the ﬁrst voluntary code of corporate governance in 1998
while drawing on the parlance of the Anglo-Saxon model of
corporate governance. It suggested the payment of execu-
tive compensation, not exceeding 1% of net proﬁts (if the
company has a managing director), or 3% (if there is no man-
aging director) to non-executive directors for offering their
professional advice. It also supported the idea of offering stock
options to the executives.
The second major corporate governance initiative was un-
dertaken by SEBI by setting up a committee headed by Kumar
Mangalam Birla2 (1999), to promote and improve the stan-
dards of corporate governance practices. The committee sug-
gested separate disclosures relating to executive compensation
in the form of remuneration package (salary, beneﬁts, bonus
etc.), ﬁxed and performance linked incentives, and stock
options. The Securities and Exchange Board of India ac-
cepted the recommendations of the Birla Committee in 2002
and made it a statutory requirement under clause 49 of the
Listing Agreement of the stock exchanges. Further, SEBI ap-
pointed the Naresh Chandra Committee (2002) and the
Narayan Murthy Committee (2004) to examine various cor-
porate governance issues. These committees offered crucial
recommendations related to corporate governance issues such
as audit committee, related party disclosures, risk manage-
ment policy, and the like. However, there were no major
changes to the recommendations of the Birla Committee with
respect to executive compensation disclosures.
Data sources and sample characteristics
The primary data source for the present study is the PROWESS
database maintained by the Centre for Monitoring Indian
Economy (CMIE). The PROWESS database provides informa-
tion for over 20,000 ﬁrms belonging to manufacturing, ser-
vices and other utilities. The dataset provides comprehensive
ﬁrm level information about ﬁnancial statements such as
balance sheet (total assets, current assets, total debt and li-
abilities), income statement (sales, expenditures and taxes),
and cash ﬂow statements. The information is mainly drawn
from the annual reports of the ﬁrms. This database was pre-
viously employed by Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru (2007), and
Khanna and Palepu (2000) to examine the relationship between
ﬁrm performance and business group afﬁliation, Ghosh (2006)
to investigate into the determinants of executive compen-
sation, and Gopalan and Gormley (2013) to examine the impact
of ﬁnancial markets’ failure on ﬁrm ﬁnancing choices.
Sample selection
We consider all Indian listed ﬁrms, for our empirical analy-
sis. The study period is from 2002 to 2012. Following the Kumar
Mangalam Birla recommendations (2002), Indian ﬁrms are re-
quired to disclose executive compensation details in their
annual reports from 2002 onwards. We exclude all ﬁnancial
services ﬁrms3 as they are subject to intense regulation and
supervision by the apex bank. We also exclude ﬁrms con-
trolled by the state and joint sector ﬁrms as their executive
compensation practices are most often not driven by eco-
nomic considerations. Further, we exclude ﬁrm year obser-
vations whose net worth is negative4 as they are considered
bankrupt and guided by the Board of Industrial and Finan-
cial Reconstruction (BIFR) regulations. Our ﬁnal sample con-
sists of 21,834 ﬁrm year observations, consisting of 3,100 ﬁrms
with an average of 7.04 years each. It is an unbalanced panel
dataset with gaps, as some ﬁrms were observed to be de-
listing and re-entering the market after a few years for various
reasons such as acquisitions and bankruptcies. Of the sample
ﬁrms, 36.37% are business group afﬁliated ﬁrms and the re-
maining 63.63% are stand-alone ﬁrms.
Selection of variables
As we examine the relationship between pay and perfor-
mance, we consider consolidated executive compensation as
the proxy for pay. We consider both accounting measures as
well as market performance measures to represent ﬁrm per-
formance (Antle & Smith, 1986; Lambert & Larcker, 1987; and
Sloan, 1993). Following Murphy (1985), Jensen and Murphy
(1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Barro and Barro (1990),
and Hubbard and Palia (1994), we use return on equity (ROE)
and ROA as the accounting based measures of ﬁrm perfor-
mance. Tobin’s Q and annual stock return (RET) are consid-
ered as the market based measures of ﬁrm performance.
Annual stock return is a forward-looking measure and re-
ﬂects investors’ future expectations. Further, we consider ﬁrm
speciﬁc variables such as size, leverage, and risk as they could
inﬂuence the pay–performance relationship. The descrip-
tion of the variables is provided in Table 1.
Summary statistics
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the relevant vari-
ables. We winsorize all the variables included at one and
ninety nine percentile of their empirical distribution to elimi-
nate the effect of outliers.
2 Kumar Mangalam Birla is an Indian industrialist and the Chairman
of the Aditya Birla Group, one of the largest conglomerate corpo-
rations in India.
3 Firms offering ﬁnancial services (including banking) as their main
economic activity are classiﬁed as per National Industrial Classiﬁ-
cation (NIC) three digit codes 641 to 663.
4 Firms, as and when they experience negative net worth, ﬁle for
bankruptcy and seek protection from BIFR under Sick Industrial Com-
pany’s act (1985).
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Table 2 summarises the sample ﬁrms’ characteristics in
terms of their size (market capitalisation and total assets),
proﬁtability (ROE and ROA), leverage, and market perfor-
mance (Tobin’s Q). Sample ﬁrms represent the broad spec-
trum of universe in terms of their size, as sample ﬁrms with
their market capitalisation range from Rs 6.55 crore5 to
351,385.4 crore. Average return on assets for the sample ﬁrms
is 10.74% as compared to 14.5% reported by Parthasarathy
et al. (2006), 14.2% by Ghosh (2006) for Indian sample ﬁrms,
and 3.15% by Canarella and Nourayi (2008) for a sample of
US ﬁrms. Mean sales for the sample ﬁrms is Rs 599.34 crore
as compared to $3516.02 million by Canarella and Nourayi
(2008) for 594 US ﬁrms. We submit that our sample repre-
sents listed ﬁrms from emerging markets that are relatively
small in size but offer higher market returns.
Estimation procedure and discussion
In this section, we describe the estimation procedure em-
ployed, and present our discussion of the ﬁndings.
Executive compensation is inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s con-
temporaneous performance. We empirically investigate the
presence of contemporaneous relationship between execu-
tive compensation and ﬁrm performance employing the
generic executive pay equation (Eq. (1))
Ln ExcPay Y Zit it it t it( ) = + + + +α β γ τ ε0 1 (1)
where Ln ExcPay( ) is the natural logarithm of executive com-
pensation. Yit is a measure of performance of the ith ﬁrm in
tth year. Z is a vector of other ﬁrm speciﬁc variables that
affect executive compensation. τ refers to time dummies and
ε is a white noise term. We estimate Eq. (1) using pooled or-
dinary least squares (POLS) and panel ﬁxed effects (FE) es-
timators. The FE estimator effectively controls the sample
ﬁrms’ unobservable ﬁxed effects. We consider both ﬁrm’s ac-
counting (ROE) as well as market performance measures
(Tobin’s Q). Other ﬁrm speciﬁc variables are ﬁrm size, le-
verage, and market risk. In addition to the contemporane-
ous relationship, there might be a long term relationship
between executive compensation and ﬁrm performance as
the compensation contracts may contain the elements of de-
ferred pay. A strong case can be made that the current ex-
ecutive compensation is not only inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s
contemporaneous performance but also its past perfor-
mance. Hence, we augment Eq. (1) by including ﬁrms’ lagged
performance as one of the independent variables.
Ln ExcPay Y Y Zit it it it t it( ) = + + + + +−α β β γ τ ε0 1 2 1 (2)
We estimate Eq. (2) using POLS and FE estimators. The ﬁnd-
ings are reported in Table 3.
Table 3 reports the ﬁndings of Eq. (2), estimated using the
pooled least squares and panel ﬁxed effects estimators. It is
observed that ﬁrms’ size positively inﬂuences their execu-
tive compensation irrespective of the model speciﬁcation and
estimators. Such a ﬁnding is consistent with those reported
by Rosen (1992), Murphy (1985), Zhou (2000), and Ryan and
Wiggins (2001) (from the US market). As expected, other5 Rs 1 Crore refers to Rs 10 million.
Table 1 Description of variables considered in the study.
Variables Description
ROA Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets
ROE Ratio of proﬁt after tax to book value of equity
Q Ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to book value of total assets
RET Annual stock return
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets
LEV Ratio of total borrowings to total assets
RISK It refers to company’s beta calculated considering BSE Sensex as the market index
Table 2 Summary statistics.
Variables No. of observations Mean STDEV P25 P50 P75 Max
ROA 19,879 0.1074 0.1084 0.0403 0.0924 0.1552 0.5277
ROE 21,830 0.0531 0.3154 0.0107 0.0804 0.1725 0.7115
Q 21,834 1.2788 1.0367 0.7822 0.9720 1.3471 6.9023
LEV 19,873 0.2906 0.1913 0.1307 0.2843 0.4278 0.7518
SIZE 21,834 4.6860 1.9184 3.2245 4.5942 6.0452 9.3617
Market cap 21,834 1047.61 7987.67 6.55 31.74 200.53 351385.40
Borrowings 19,873 277.41 1548.29 4.88 25.09 125.93 73904.48
RET 19,787 0.4195 1.2099 -0.2930 0.0500 0.6814 6.5547
Exec’s remuneration 13,943 1.2482 3.9428 0.1000 0.3000 0.9500 128.8000
Table reports the summary statistics of the sample ﬁrms. All the variables included are winsorized at one as well as at ninety nine per-
centile to eliminate the effect of extreme values. The deﬁnition of variables is provided in Table 1.
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control variables such as sample ﬁrms’ leverage and market
risk report the signiﬁcant negative and positive inﬂuence on
their executive compensation respectively. From speciﬁca-
tions 1 and 5, it is evident that executive compensation is posi-
tively inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s contemporaneous performance.
When we consider contemporaneous as well as past perfor-
mance in the same model, we ﬁnd that they signiﬁcantly in-
ﬂuence executive compensation (speciﬁcations 2 and 6).
With respect to the market based performance measure
(Tobin Q), we report positive and signiﬁcant relationship with
executive compensation (speciﬁcations 3 and 7). When we con-
sider contemporaneous as well as past market based perfor-
mance, we ﬁnd that they signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the executive
compensation (speciﬁcations 4 and 8) once the ﬁrmﬁxed effects
are controlled. The inﬂuence of past performance along with
current performance on executive compensation may be
because of the information revealed by the ﬁrm’s past perfor-
mance about the agents’ (managers’) future ability. It further
reduces the severity of the ﬁrm’s adverse selection problems.
When past performance is high, the principals (shareholders)
can provide the continuing agents with a higher compensa-
tion (Banker, Darrough, Huang, & Plehn-Dujowich, 2013).
Further, we understand that the current executive com-
pensation is also inﬂuenced by the past compensation, along
with the ﬁrm’s past as well as contemporaneous perfor-
mance. Remuneration committees often consider the previ-
ous year’s pay as the starting point before deciding on the
current year’s compensation (Bender, 2003). The current
year’s compensation is then inﬂuenced by the previous year’s
compensation. Consideration of the past compensation as one
of the explanatory variables makes our estimation equation
a dynamic one. It may also be argued that the ﬁrm’s perfor-
mance is also inﬂuenced by the previous executive compen-
sation. The potential simultaneous relationship between
executive compensation and ﬁrm performance may cause the
endogeneity problem in our estimating equation.
Ln ExcPay Ln ExcPay Y
Y Z
it it it
it it t it
( ) = + ( ) +
+ + + +
−
−
α δ β
β γ τ ε
0 1 1
2 1
(3)
Estimating Eq. (3) using the traditionally established panel
ﬁxed effects estimator may eliminate the ﬁrm ﬁxed effects
but it provides unreliable estimates due to ﬁnite sample bias
(Baltagi, 2008; Nickell, 1981). The traditional instrumental
variable estimator can address the issue of ﬁnite sample bias,
if we can identify the perfect external instruments which are
correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables but not
with the residuals. The external instruments for perfor-
mance and agency variables are difﬁcult to identify. In order
to effectively eliminate the ﬁrm ﬁxed effects and address the
issue of simultaneous bias (endogeneity), we choose dynamic
panel estimator to estimate the Eq. (3). We employ the
system-GMM estimator (Blundell & Bond, 1998). The system-
GMM estimator estimates equation 3 simultaneously at levels
(original equation) as well as at ﬁrst differences. The esti-
mator ﬁrst differences the data to eliminate ﬁrm ﬁxed effects
and uses the differenced variables as instruments in the level
equation. Thus, the system-GMM estimator, using the inter-
nally generated instruments, is poised to address the
endogeneity problem effectively and eliminate the ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects (Wooldridge, 2002).
We primarily estimate Eq. (3), using one step system GMM
and consider lagged levels (t-2 to t-4) of all independent vari-
ables as instruments for the regression in differences and
lagged differences (t-2 to t-4) as instruments for the regres-
sion in levels. The estimated standard errors are robust to
the potential heteroskedasticity problem. To assess the
presence of second order serial correlation in ﬁrst differenced
Table 3 Contemporaneous estimation of relationship between executive compensation and ﬁrm performance.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) Panel ﬁxed effects (FE)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ROE_t 0.4010*** 0.2997*** 0.1707*** 0.1378***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ROE_t-1 0.3418*** 0.2059***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Q_t 0.1499*** 0.1415*** 0.0876*** 0.0741***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Q_t-1 0.0331* 0.0376***
(0.0860) (0.0040)
Size_t 0.6129*** 0.6070*** 0.6055*** 0.6017*** 0.4976*** 0.4669*** 0.5101*** 0.4880***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Lev_t −0.4329*** −0.3818*** −0.4679*** −0.4338*** −0.6286*** −0.5257*** −0.7313*** −0.6872***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Risk_t 0.1112*** 0.1020*** 0.1200*** 0.1185*** 0.0593*** 0.0416** 0.0599*** 0.0475**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0020) (0.0390) (0.0010) (0.0190)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.5975 0.5947 0.5980 0.5941 0.4850 0.4561 0.4857 0.4547
N 12799 11317 12799 11317 12799 11317 12799 11317
***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Table presents the ﬁndings from estimating Eq. (2) using pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and panel ﬁxed effects (FE) estimators.
The numbers in parenthesis are corresponding p-values. The deﬁnition of variables is provided in Table 1.
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residuals, we report p-value of M2 with the null hypothesis
of no serial correlation. Further, we report p-values of Hansen
test to investigate the joint validity of instruments. Table 4
reports the ﬁndings of estimating Eq. (3).
Table 4 reports the ﬁndings of Eq. 3, estimated using the
system-GMM estimator. Our results suggest that past pay has
positive and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on current pay irrespec-
tive of model speciﬁcations (speciﬁcations 1–4). This may be
due to the fact that the remuneration committees consider
past pay as the reference while setting current compensa-
tion (Bender, 2003). The ﬁrm performance, particularly ac-
counting performance, continued to have signiﬁcant positive
inﬂuence on the executive compensation, even in the pres-
ence of past compensation as an additional variable.
Sample splits
It is clear from the literature that the relationship between
pay and performance is inﬂuenced by the ﬁrms’ governance
which in turn is inﬂuenced by the type of ownership and ﬁrm
size. Such an inﬂuence is more apparent among the ﬁrms op-
erating in emerging markets. For instance, ﬁrms with larger
size, given their market reputation, are expected to have
greater diligence in their compensation practices when com-
pared to the smaller ﬁrms. We attempt to empirically vali-
date the heterogeneity in the magnitude of pay–performance
relationship by classifying the ﬁrm year observations based
on the ﬁrms’ size and their type of ownership.
Sample splits based on ownership classiﬁcation
As in the case of various previous studies (Gopalan et al., 2007
and Khanna & Palepu, 2000), 39.95% of our sample ﬁrms are
afﬁliated to business groups. In India, business groups with
their internal capital markets assist their afﬁliates to navi-
gate the underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets and regulatory
mechanisms. In the literature, there is no consensus on the
role of business groups and there have been various argu-
ments about this. Business groups facilitate funds appropria-
tion by the dominant owners. This has been empirically
validated in the funds appropriation or tunnelling argument
by Rajan and Zingales (2003). Business groups help their af-
ﬁliated ﬁrms in smoothening the distress periods by way of
internal fund transfers. It is famously known as risk sharing
argument (Gopalan et al., 2007). Business groups are also
argued to be more prudent in their dealings with the other
stakeholders, as it otherwise could have negative implica-
tions on the other afﬁliates (Gopalan & Jayaraman, 2012).
In line with the reputation argument, we expect that the pay–
performance relationship would be stronger among the busi-
ness group afﬁliated ﬁrms than their standalone counterparts.
However, the operation of internal capital markets may ame-
liorate the business group ﬁrms from market dynamics and
may potentially hamper the market determined pay–
performance relationship. On the other hand, standalone ﬁrms
with their necessity to deal with the ﬁnancial markets are ex-
pected to be more cautious and prudent in their executive
compensation practices. Table 5 reports ﬁndings for sample
splits based on ownership classiﬁcation.
It is clear from Table 5 that the current executive com-
pensation is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the past compensa-
tion across both the stand-alone and business group afﬁliated
ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that pay–performance relationship is signiﬁ-
cant only among stand-alone ﬁrms. Executive compensa-
tion is not inﬂuenced by ﬁrm performance among the business
Table 4 Estimation of relationship between executive compensation and ﬁrm performance using dynamic panel estimator.
1 2 3 4
ExPay_t-1 0.3490*** 0.3446*** 0.3468*** 0.3387***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ROE_t 0.2822** 0.2831**
(0.0370) (0.0350)
ROE_t-1 0.0950
(0.3050)
Q_t 0.0529 0.0494
(0.1340) (0.1590)
Q_t-1 0.0340
(0.1960)
Size_t 0.3201*** 0.3348*** 0.2182** 0.2417**
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0410) (0.0250)
Lev_t −0.6293* −0.6160* −0.0329 −0.0644
(0.0550) (0.0600) (0.9290) (0.8610)
Risk_t −0.1028 −0.0946 −0.0752 −0.0538
(0.3220) (0.3590) (0.4290) (0.5750)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
M1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
M2 0.3260 0.3140 0.2700 0.2770
Hansen test (p-value) 0.3490 0.4720 0.0210 0.2790
Observations 7529 7529 7529 7529
***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Table presents the ﬁndings from estimating Eq. (3) using one step system-GMM. We consider lagged levels (t-2 to t-4) of all indepen-
dent variables as instruments for the regression in differences and lagged differences (t-2 to t-4) as instruments for the regression in
levels. The numbers in parenthesis are corresponding p-values. The deﬁnition of variables is provided in Table 1.
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group afﬁliated ﬁrms. Such evidence may be attributed to the
prevalent owner–manager practices among Indian business
group ﬁrms (Khanna and Palepu 2000). It could also be argued
that business group ﬁrms address the agency problems through
alternative mechanisms such as debt ﬁnancing (Jensen, 1986)
rather than performance based executive compensation.
However, the absence of pay–performance relationship among
business group ﬁrms throws bleak light on the performance
based executive compensation practices of Indian business
group afﬁliated ﬁrms.
Sample splits based on ﬁrm size
As previously mentioned, ﬁrms with larger size, given their
opacity, are expected to have greater diligence in their com-
pensation practices when compared to the smaller ﬁrms. In
the current subsection, we attempt to empirically validate
the heterogeneity in the magnitude of pay–performance re-
lationship by classifying the ﬁrm year observations based on
the ﬁrms’ size. We classify the sample ﬁrms into quartile
groups based on the value of ﬁrms’ assets. We consider ﬁrms
that fall in the ﬁrst quartile as small,6 and those that fall in
the fourth quartile as large ﬁrms. We separately estimate Eq.
(3) using both the small and large ﬁrms. Table 6 presents the
ﬁndings.
From Table 6, it is clear that the persistence in execu-
tive compensation exists across the sample ﬁrms irrespec-
tive of their size as we report that current executive
compensation is inﬂuenced by the past compensation. We ﬁnd
signiﬁcant pay–performance relationship among the larger
sample ﬁrms, and the pay–performance relationship seems
to be absent among the smaller sample ﬁrms. These ﬁnd-
ings are consistent with those reported by Zhou (2000) among
US ﬁrms; and C Joe Ueng, Wells, and Lilly (2000) from US ﬁrms.
However, the magnitude of the estimates is relatively smaller
among our sample ﬁrms. Such a ﬁnding could be attributed
to the nature of emerging markets which fare worse than de-
veloped markets as far as investor activism is concerned. Only
larger ﬁrms are actively followed by the analysts and only their
corporate governance practices such as executive compen-
sation are intensively monitored. The small ﬁrms do not attract
adequate attention in emerging markets.
Concluding remarks
In this study, we empirically examine the pay–performance
relationship among Indian ﬁrms. The study reports signiﬁ-
cant persistence in executive compensation among the sample
ﬁrms. The persistence in the executive compensation exists
even among the sub-samples of ﬁrms, classiﬁed based on size
and ownership. Findings also suggest the existence of sig-
niﬁcant pay–performance relationship among the sample ﬁrms.
However, when performance is measured using market based
measures, we do not ﬁnd pay–performance relationship among
the sample ﬁrms. It may be argued that sample ﬁrms deter-
mine their executive compensation based on the accounting
6 The small ﬁrms, here refer to the small ﬁrms in the context of the
current sample ﬁrms, they may not be the small among the popu-
lation of Indian ﬁrms.
Table 5 Ownership classiﬁcation and relationship between executive compensation and ﬁrm performance.
Business group afﬁliated ﬁrms Stand-alone ﬁrms
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ExPay_t-1 0.2426*** 0.2414*** 0.1950*** 0.1870*** 0.3152*** 0.3170*** 0.2834*** 0.2839***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0040) (0.0060) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ROE_t −0.1219 −0.1062 0.2153** 0.2162**
(0.2810) (0.3810) (0.0430) (0.0410)
ROE_t-1 0.0673 −0.0172
(0.5820) (0.8050)
Q_t 0.0671 0.0656 0.0441 0.0381
(0.2200) (0.2280) (0.2700) (0.3300)
Q_t-1 0.0521 0.0200
(0.2870) (0.4440)
Size_t 0.5476*** 0.5526*** 0.9144*** 0.9309*** 0.2701*** 0.2670*** 0.1603 0.1657*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0060 (0.0070) (0.1070) (0.0930)
Lev_t −0.6389 −0.6085 −0.4193 −0.4223 −0.3344 −0.3381 −0.2972 −0.3222
(0.2300) (0.2650) (0.4140 (0.4160) (0.2680) (0.2620) (0.3690 (0.3290)
Risk_t 0.1948* 0.1949* 0.1932 0.2090 −0.1763 −0.1762 −0.2180** −0.2059**
(0.0960) (0.0940) (0.1450 (0.1180) (0.1040) (0.1050) (0.0170) (0.0250)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
M1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
M2 0.1050 0.1120 0.1310 0.1130 0.7520 0.7560 0.6750 0.7470
Hansen test (p-value) 0.9600 0.9660 0.9060 0.9310 0.7610 0.6850 0.0520 0.0000
Observations 2484 2484 2484 2484 5045 5045 5045 5045
***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Table presents the ﬁndings from estimating Eq. (3) using one step system GMM. We consider the PROWESS classiﬁcation of ﬁrms into
business group afﬁliated, and stand-alone ﬁrms. The numbers in parenthesis are corresponding p-values. The deﬁnition of variables is
provided in Table 1.
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based measures of ﬁrm performance rather than market based
measures. Further, we report the absence of pay–performance
relationship among the business group afﬁliated ﬁrms, whereas
their stand-alone counterparts report signiﬁcant pay–
performance relationship. Such an observation casts doubts
over the performance based executive compensation prac-
tices of Indian business group afﬁliated ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd
that the pay–performance relationship is absent among the
small sample ﬁrms, but the relationship is signiﬁcant among
the larger sample ﬁrms. We attribute such a contrast in our
observation to the underdeveloped nature of institutional
mechanisms and weak investor activism in India.
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